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Duty of Confidentiality in Korea
BySUH-YOUNG SHIN*
I. Introduction
Confidentiality is an attorney's special right as well as a
fundamental duty.' In the United States, professional rules of
conduct for attorneys have been established to guide how a lawyer
should act in relation to a client regarding communication between
the client and the lawyer.2 The rules are fairly comprehensive for
attorneys in independent practice.3 However, when it comes to in-
house counsel, sources that attorneys can depend on are scarce.4 In
the Republic of Korea, where the rules of ethics for attorneys in
general are very broad and somewhat ambiguous, it is doubly difficult
for in-house counsel to determine how to respond (or whether to
respond) when the corporation for whom they work engages in
unlawful conduct.5
This note will study the problems arising under the current
Korean rules regarding ethical standards for attorneys in light of the
recent scandal involving Samsung Corporation. The Korean rule will
be analyzed and compared to the American code of professional
ethics and conduct. The note will then discuss difficulties of directly
adopting the U.S. rules governing attorney-client privilege and
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1. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 10 (2004).
2. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2008).
3. Id.
4. JOHN DZIENKOWSKI, EVOLVING ISSUES FOR CORPORATE LAWYERS AND IN-
HOUSE COUNSEL 2 (2003).
5. Jungbum Kim, It's Still Early to Discuss Disciplinary Actions against Kim,
THE LAW TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, available athttp://www.lawtimes.co.kr/LawEdit/ Edit
/EditContents.aspx?kind=ba04&serial=34669.
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confidentiality into Korea considering the historical, societal, and
legal context surrounding Samsung, or chaebol (major conglomerate
business groups in Korea) at large.
II. The Samsung Scandal
A huge scandal surrounding Samsung, the largest corporation 6 in
Korea, erupted in the late 2007. Kim Yong-Chul, Samsung's former7
top in-house counsel, made a public announcement that Samsung
allegedly maintained slush funds to bribe prosecutors, judges, and
government officials to hide tax evasion arising from the illegal
handling of the father-to-son transfer of equity in Samsung Life, from
the chairman of the company to his son.8 An investigation was
launched after the announcement of the transfer, with the
appointment of a special prosecutor.9 The scandal ignited a heated
debate within the Korean legal community, as well as among the
general public, regarding whether Kim should be subject to discipline
by the Korean Bar Association for disclosing his client's confidential
information.'"
Kim claimed that he should not be subject to the duty of
confidentiality for attorneys because his relationship with Samsung
was that of an employee and employer, rather than an attorney and
his client." However, the president of the Korean Bar Association
underscored the fact that Kim was not a mere staff member of
Samsung who dealt with mundane legal issues but was deeply
involved in previous suits regarding the father-to-son transfer of
Samsung shares. 2 According to the Korean Bar Association, such
involvement constituted legal representation by an attorney, making
6. Samsung Group, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samsung#-note-4 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2008).
7. He was apparently fired due to some undisclosed conflict.
8. Samsung denied all the allegations.
9. Bomi Lim, South Korea Lawmakers Seek Independent Samsung Probe,
Bloomberg.com, Nov. 23, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =
newsarchive&sid=akIPxFlM7Rqs.
10. Id.
11. Q&A on Kim's Additional Disclosure, CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 26, 2007, available
at http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2007/11/26/2007112601044.html.
12. Jaehong Kim, The Disclosure of Samsung Scandal, THE LAW TIMES, Nov. 12,
2007, http://www.lawtimes.co.kr/LawNews/News/NewsContents.aspx?serial=34291
(last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
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Samsung Kim's client 3 and thus subjecting Kim to the duty of
confidentiality. On the other hand, many non-governmental
organizations in Korea argue that Kim should not be penalized for
disclosing Samsung's alleged wrongdoings. 4 They enthusiastically
support Kim's disclosure and praise his courage in standing up against
what they perceive as a big, greedy conglomerate."
This incident gives rise to several legal questions. Are in-house
attorneys like Kim subject to the same professional rules of conduct
as attorneys in independent practice when it comes to the duty of
confidentiality? More specifically, in the instant case, would Kim be
regarded as an attorney and Samsung his client, or merely an
employer and an employee? Moreover, if we assume that in-house
counsel are subject to the same ethical standards as independent
attorneys, would in-house counsel be allowed to disclose their
employer's secret information regarding bribery and tax evasion?
III. Applicable Laws
A. The Professional Rules of Conduct in Korea
Section 23 of the Korean Bar Association Code of Conduct and
Ethics states that "[a]n attorney should not reveal any information
learned through the representation of his or her client... However,
the attorney may disclose information, to the extent necessary, in
order to uphold the public interest or to protect his or her own
rights."16 The Korean standard allows disclosure of information in
exceptional cases, where disclosure would be beneficial to the public
or to protect the attorney's own rights. 7 However, even in those
cases, disclosure must be limited "to the extent necessary."' 8
The language of the rule makes it difficult to determine when
disclosure is permitted. The rule is broad and its language rather
vague. 9 In particular, the Korean rule does not provide any guidance
13. Id.
14. Lawyers with the Citizens, A Statement by Lawyers with the Citizens, Apr.
18, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.kr/news01/n_view.html?id=
22092&kind=menu_code&keys=1 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
15. Id.
16. KOREAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS AND CONDUCT § 23 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Byung-Tae Kang, Rules of Ethics and Conscience, HANKOOK ILBO, Nov. 8,
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as to what situations would fit "upholding public interest." 20 The
Code of Conduct and Ethics consists of seven chapters and thirty-
eight sections of rules for attorneys, only one of which, Section 23,
deals with an attorney's duty of confidentiality, and that section does
not help decide the inquiry into whether Kim's conduct is
permissible.2
B. Special Role of Law.yers
Lawyers have an official status as licensed fiduciaries in the
public interest, charged with encouraging compliance with legal
norms.22 As the Preamble to ABA Model Rules states, "As a public
citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the
legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession ... A lawyer should ... help the bar
regulate itself in the public interest." 23
However, Hazard and Dondi, prominent scholars in the field of
legal ethics, state that there is no "legal basis of any such
obligation.., to protect third-party interests."'24 Surely it would be
ideal for lawyers to always be ethical, looking out for justice and
public interest. In fact, lawyers are prohibited from "knowingly
counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud."25
However, Hazard and Dondi note that lawyers are in a rather
peculiar position.26  In fact, the Preamble to Model Rules
acknowledges "conflicting responsibilities" for lawyers.27 Specifically,
"[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the
lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a
satisfactory living." '  According to the Model Rules, the most




22. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 159.
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. T 6 (2003).
24. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 223.
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (2003).
26. However, Hazard and Dondi still believe that justice and truth in legal
profession are still pursuable and achievable.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2003).
28. Id
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important value to be held by lawyers is loyalty to clients, 29 and one of
the most important ways to maintain loyalty to clients is by abiding by
the duty of confidentiality.3" The trust within the relationship guarded
by the duty of confidentiality and loyalty is the fundamental right and
duty of an attorney.31 Therefore, even when a client commits a crime
or fraud "in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
services," the Model Rule does not demand that the lawyer reveal
information relating to the representation of the client. 2 Rather, the
rule states that the lawyer "may reveal information ... to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary.. ." (emphasis added)."
The Korean rule, in contrast, is more lenient than its American
counterpart in terms of the requirement to keep the duty of
confidentiality when the public interest is implicated, putting the
social duty of attorneys to the public before their fiduciary duty to
clients. Thus, the special role of lawyers as described above would be
difficult to be maintained, for lawyers in Korea are expected to be
loyal more to the public as a whole rather than to their clients.
It is only natural that different legal systems have different
expectations for lawyers, as each legal system is embedded in a
particular society and culture, and lawyers have corresponding role to
that society.34 However, in the context of the duty of confidentiality
for attorneys in Korea, it would be useful to compare to the
counterpart rules established in the United States. Studying the
American rule and standard and comparing them with the
corresponding Korean rules will shed light on what ideal rules of
professional responsibility for attorneys would look like.
29. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 8-9.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
31. Mary J. Daly, The Ethical Implications of the Globalization of the Legal
Profession: A Challenge to the Teaching of Professional Responsibility in the 21"
Century, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1239, 1277 (1998).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2003).
33. Id. at R. 1.6(b) (2003) (emphasis added).
34. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 16-18.
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C. The U.S. Rule
i ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Since it is difficult to determine whether Kim's conduct was
permissible under the rather broad Korean rule, it would be helpful
to analyze the case upon the American rule on the duty of
confidentiality, which is much more comprehensive and detailed.35
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules, a general rule on the duty of
confidentiality, is much more specific than its Korean counterpart.
The rule stipulates that:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary... (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or
fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of
which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services; (3) to
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result
or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services."
Samsung surely did not give its consent to disclosing the
information, so under subsection (a), Kim should not have revealed
information relating to his representation of Samsung. However,
under the subsection (b), it could be argued that Kim's actions were
to mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests of
another that was reasonably certain to result or had resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud. For the Chairman of
Samsung to arrange the transfer of shares of stock between various
subsidiaries of Samsung in order to leave a large inheritance for his
son while avoiding Korean gift or estate tax is certainly prohibited
under Korean law.3 An illegal transfer of shares would negatively
35. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 1.6 (2003).
36. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (2003).
37. Chang-Ryul Kwak, Yongchul Kim Calls Joongang Ilbo and Samsung Group's
Separation a Mere Disguise, CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 28, 2007, available at
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2007/ll/26/2007112600951.html.
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affect other shareholders, and evading tax would damage public
confidence and the economy in general. Therefore, it may be argued
that the chairman of Samsung had engaged in illegal conduct, and
Kim's disclosure of that conduct would fall under the exception 38 to
the general confidentiality rule.
Nevertheless, as noted above, the special role and duty of a
lawyer mandate that a lawyer's primary duty is to his or her client and
not to society as a whole.39 Therefore, even though the disclosure of
information may be permitted in some circumstances, the rule
explicitly states that the disclosure should be limited "to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary."" It should be noted that
the duty of confidentiality and loyalty clearly does not extend to
covering up or assisting illegitimate wrongdoings of a client.4"
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has found
disclosure of client information proper only in limited circumstances
such as when the client committed perjury during trial.42 The
Comment to Model Rule 1.6 states that "where practicable, the
lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action
to obviate the need for disclosure."43 Kim does not appear to have
tried to persuade Samsung to take appropriate action to obviate the
need for disclosure. Rather, he waited several years after he left
Samsung to reveal the confidential information.
However, Model Rule 1.6" does not help to resolve Kim's main
argument that he is not subject to the duty, as his relationship is that
of employee/employer with Samsung. In Europe (as in Korea),
where the civil law system is employed, it has been decided that the
attorney-client privilege only applies to independent lawyers and not
to members of the legal department of an organization.45 Under that
reasoning, client information in Kim's possession would not be
subject to the attorney-client privilege and thus he would not have the
duty to withhold or protect the information. On the other hand, the
38. See generally Mark L. Tuft, For Your Eyes Only, 25 L.A. LAWYER 26 (2002)
for a general overview of the duty of confidentiality.
39. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 14.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.6(b) (2003).
41. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,176 (1986).
42. Id. at 166-71.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.6 cmt. $ 14 (2003).
44. Id. at R. 1.6 (2003).
45. Case no. 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. V. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575
(1982).
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American rule would hold otherwise. Rule 1.13 (b)" stipulates that
in-house lawyers with an organization as a client are bound by legal
ethics. It states that a lawyer can disclose information when:
... a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action,
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization ....
Even as an in-house attorney, in effect an employee of the
corporation, under the American system, Kim would be bound by the
legal ethics code.
As with the analysis under Rule 1.6, Samsung's actions do come
within the kinds of behavior mentioned in the rule: bribery, tax
evasion, and stock manipulation are all violations of law that can be
imputed to the organization and are likely to result in substantial
injury to the financial interest of the organization. However, Kim was
not prudent in how he went about solving the problem. This rule
allows disclosure of information but "only if and to the extent that the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to
the organization. '4 8 The rule mandates that "the lawyer shall refer
the matter to a higher authority in the organization" before disclosing
the information.49 Had Kim been in an American jurisdiction, he
would have been subject to discipline for publicly announcing
Samsung's wrongdoings instead of speaking with a higher authority,
such as the CEO of the company or the board of directors.
It is crucial to point out the distinction between individual clients
and clients that are organizations. Rule 1.13(a) explicitly explains
that a lawyer "employed or retained by an organization represents
the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."5
The Comment to the rule states that "an organizational client is a
legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders and other constituents." 1 It nonetheless
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 (2003).
47. Id.
48. Id. atR. 1.13(c)(2) (2003).
49. Id atR. 1.13(b) (2003).
50. Id. atR. 1.13(a) (2003).
51. Id. atR. 1.13 cmt. (2003).
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emphasizes the fact that it "does not mean, however, that constituents
of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer."52 Then, one
might argue that because the chairman of Samsung was not a direct
client of Kim's, and it was the chairman, not the organization itself,
who demanded bribery and participated in the tax evasion, Kim does
not have any ethical duty under this rule to protect the information. 3
The circumstances, however, are more complex. Even though it is
true that the chairman was not directly Kim's client, the actions taken
by the chairman are violations of law that "reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization.5 14 Therefore, Kim is, again, on the hook of
Rule 1.13. As discussed above, he should have consulted with higher
authorities within the organization before going public.
Although Rule 1.13 deals generally with the case of attorneys
with an organization as a client, there are many subtle differences
between in-house lawyers and outside attorneys with organizations as
clients.5  The starkest difference is that in-house counsel are
employees of the organization, subject to the internal hierarchy and
operations of the entity. 6 In-house attorneys are dependent on their
"powerful client" for their income." This translates into a
circumstance where it may be more difficult for in-house attorneys to
directly challenge issues or even to bring them to higher authorities as
Rule 1.13 requires. Moreover, the highest authority within a
corporation is almost always the board of directors." As in-house
counsel often have a seat on the board, the situation could arise in
which the attorney would face the board which made the decision
that the attorney seeks to contest. 9 Such frustration and unease
would likely be compounded in Korea where it is institutionally and
culturally unacceptable to question your superior.60
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 cmt. (2003).
53. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 220-21 (stating that under the civil law
system, attorneys represent both the corporation and its officials).
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUct R. 1.13(b) (2003).
55. DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 4, at 3-4.
56. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. (2003).
57. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 217.
58. Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 181 (2001).
59. Id at 182.
60. But see Daly, supra note 31, at 7. The author presents a different view on the
position of in-house counsels in a corporation. She writes that they take rather a
"proactive" role whereby they engage not only in solving legal issues but also in
2009]
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. Restatement of Agency
Agency law also provides rules relevant to the instant facts. The
Restatement of Agency, Section 8.05, covers the duty of
confidentiality of all employees, which presumably includes in-house
counsel.6 The rule states that "[a]n agent has a duty.., not to use or
communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent's
own purposes. ,12 it is likely that the duty of confidentiality under the
Restatement would not be applied as stringently as the duty of
confidentiality under the Model Rule, for as discussed earlier in
Section B, lawyers have a special role and fiduciary duty toward their
principals (clients). However, agency law, too, "prescribes that, unless
the proposed action is illegal, an agent is obliged to follow the
directions of the principal."63 As to the scope of agency law, the duty
not to communicate covers information gathered during the period an
employment relationship existed." Therefore, even if Kim was no
longer Samsung's employee when he disclosed the information,
because the information had been obtained in the scope of his
employment, he is still bound by the agency law of confidentiality.
IV. Proposal for Modifying the Korean Rule
A. Legal Ethics in a Social Context
Under the current broad and vague language of the Korean rule
on the duty of confidentiality for attorneys, it is very likely that many
instances of disclosure would be condoned in the name of the "public
interest."6  In Korea, as a less individual-oriented society (as
compared to the United States), more things can pass under the
public interest rationale, rather than being screened by an explicit
rule of law. That is, in Korea, much can be condoned and sacrificed
for the interest of the society as a whole. That being said, it would be
advisable to propose adopting a rule similar to the U.S. rules of
professional conduct, which is much more specific, illustrative, and
protective of the special role of attorneys.
general planning and management.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006).
62. Id.
63. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 177.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006).
65. KOREAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS AND CONDUCr § 23 (2000).
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However, it would be a difficult task to directly adopt the
American rules in Korea. Not only are the legal systems different,
but the societies and cultures are fairly disparate. According to
Hazard and Dondi, "[l]egal ethics.., is an amalgam of all these
normative sources - law, social convention, and morality." Legal
ethics can be only thought of in the context of the larger society,
culture, and history. Hazard and Dondi call the context "concrete
realities," meaning "specific circumstances of place, time,
participants, viewpoint, and course of events., 67  Therefore, it is
crucial to consider the "concrete realities" in which in-house
attorneys in Korea operate in seeking to delineate the terms of their
duty of confidentiality.
B. The Korean Context
i. Chaebol
In order to see the concrete realities for in-house attorneys in
Korea, it is necessary to discuss the nature of these corporations,
especially the largest ones known as chaebol.8  It is generally
accepted that it was the chaebol that brought the rapid economic
success in post-war Korea between the 1970s and 1990s. 69  The
Korean government was highly protective of the business groups
throughout that period and employed various measures to aid the
growth of the chaebol. The government caused banks to provide low
interest loans, extended tax cuts on imports and exports, and
designated ° focus industries for each company to specialize in."
These protective measures have been criticized, however, and
symbiotic relationships that developed between the business groups
and the government, ranging from cooperation to collusion and
corruption, are thought to be the major cause of the financial crisis in
Korea in the late 1990s.72 Nevertheless, it is an undeniable truth that
66. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 3.
67. Id at 3-4.
68. Chaebol is a Korean word for a large corporation with diverse business
activities.
69. Chaebol, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaebol (last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
70. However, at the same time, the conglomerates are known for their expansive
scope of industries.
71. Boong-Kyu Lee, Don Quixote or Robin Hood?.• Minority Shareholder Rights
and Corporate Governance in Korea, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 345, 349 (2002).
72. Hwa Jin Kim, Living with the IMF- A New Approoach to Corporate
2009]
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the business groups have brought wealth and development to the
country.73
ii. The Protective View
Following the outbreak of the share transfer scandal, a significant
view in Korea is that the Samsung Group should be protected,
regardless of their alleged wrongdoing, due to the impact it would
have on the economy as a whole if a large corporation is damaged by
criminal allegations.74 Naturally, there always are voices of pessimism
about the negative effects on the economy as a whole when any legal
decision against a business group comes out.75 In fact, Samsung's
yearly profit constitutes as much as 17 percent of the Korea's GDP.76
This lends to a discussion of what is the "public interest" to be
protected in the present case.77 While Kim argues that it was in the
public interest for him to reveal the information,8 those who believe
that Samsung should be protected assert that it would be against
public interest to penalize Samsung. 9 Consequently, they claim that
for the purposes of protecting real public interest, Samsung's alleged
wrongdoing should be condoned and it is rather Kim's disclosure that
should be condemned. 80
This view is reflected in a public survey conducted in Korea in
late December 2007 following the outbreak of the scandal.8" Samsung
was voted to be the most valued company among all the business
groups in terms of public regard.82 Moreover, Samsung's chairman
Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 61,69 (1999).
73. Supra note 6.
74. J. Kim, supra note 5.
75. Lee, supra note 71, at 350.
76. Yoonkyung Kim, Foreign Press Watches the Samsung Scandal, HANKOOK
ILBO, Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://news.hankooki.comlpage/economy/200711/
h2007112811005121540.htm.
77. See KOREAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS AND CONDUCT § 23 (2000).
78. Kim, supra note 12 at 3.
79. Chul-oh Song, Increasing Concern for Impact on the Economy, HANKOOK
ECONOMY, Dec 5, 2007, available at http://www.wownet.co.kr/news/wownews /view.
asp?bcode=N07010000&artid=M200712050003.
80. Id
81. Sunki Chung, Chairman Kunhee Lee, the Most Admired CEO, BREAKNEWS,
March 6, 2007, http://www.breaknews.com/subread.html?uid=61995&section
=section42&section2=%20-%2047k%20- (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
82. Id.
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was found to be the most respected business group leader. 3
Another issue that factors into deciding how to deal with the
Samsung scandal are concerns about the potential consequences in
case Kim's action is condoned. Companies would be reluctant to hire
in-house attorneys, which would be detrimental to the legal
community as a whole.8 Hazard and Dondi elaborated a similar
view, stating that if attorneys are permitted to disclose client
information when they seek "justice" instead of sticking to what their
client desires, then corporations are much more likely to "closely
scrutinize the political outlook of lawyers they might engage.,81
ii. The Anti-Chaebol View
Another widespread opinion regarding this matter is that Kim
did something courageous and valuable.86 This view emphasizes the
need to fight the deep-rooted corruption of business groups.87 As
discussed earlier, the protectionist measures toward conglomerates
and the intricate web of operations within the groups have been cited
as the reason the Korean economy plummeted in 1997.8' Since the
financial crisis of the late 1990s, the'government, together with
economists, legal experts, and companies, have devised reform
measures with a focus on regulating the market with stricter rule of
law.89  The efforts have been generally well-received, and the
economy has made a rapid recovery. 90 However, many say that the
reform and restructuring were far from perfect.91
The biggest criticism about the reform measures is that corporate
83. Id.
84. The Bar Association Fears Less Demand for In-House Counsels:
Confidentiality over Truth, THE HANKYOREH, Nov. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society-general/248901.html.
85. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 1, at 285-86.




88. The Chaebol Drag Each Other Down, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1997,
available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story-id=109064.
89. Christopher Hale, Addressing the Incentive for Expropriation within
Business Groups: The Case of Korean Chaebol, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 24 (2006).
90. John M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related
Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175, 219 (2004).
91. Craig Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Rang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance in
Korea's Largest Companies, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 60 (2000).
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behavior is still not transparent, and conglomerates still are perceived
by many as not playing by the fair market rules.92 Rule of law in the
Korean business sector is not perfectly market-oriented; it is still
dependent on relations with the government and family ties between
subsidiaries within a business group.93 Citizen groups and many non-
governmental organizations have been striving to establish more
transparent rules of law.94 Against this backdrop, Kim's disclosure,
regardless of any legal issues involving his duty as an attorney, is
viewed by many as an effort to cure the problems. This view
maintains that business groups like Samsung should play by fair rules
and be subject to judicial discipline, as appropriate and necessary.9'
V. Conclusion
The Samsung scandal illustrates not only the vagueness of the
Korean version of professional rules of conduct for attorneys, but also
how the legal system in Korea is deeply entangled with notions of
economic prosperity and public policy. The legal issues concerning
whether an in-house counsel may or may not reveal confidential
information, where a corporation engages in improper conduct, are
difficult to resolve if one relies on the Korean rule of confidentiality.
Studying the American rules of professional conduct, with a
separate rule on attorneys with organizations as clients, sheds some
light on how to evaluate Kim's disclosure of Samsung's alleged
conduct. Under the American rules, Kim should have informed a
higher authority within the corporation first. Moreover, he should
have limited his disclosure to the extent that was reasonably
necessary. However, the Korean rule is very vague, merely hinting at
what was necessary to protect the public interest.
Modifying the Korean rule based on the American rule would
seem ideal, as there are many potential problems with attorneys
within an organization as their clients and employers (as discussed),
and more specific rules would minimize those problems. However,
there are obstacles when one attempts to adopt the rules directly.
Especially considering how corporations are perceived in Korea, and
how the economy as a whole is dependent on large corporations, one
92. J. Kim, supra note 5.
93. Id.
94. Lawyers with the Citizens, supra note 14.
95. Lee, supra note 71, at 355.
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must realize that devising a rule of law for in-house counsel who work
for/in those corporations is not possible in isolation from the societal
context.
However, one must never forget that it is attorneys that we are
dealing with. Attorneys have a special role within a society. While
attorneys stand for the administration of justice and the public
interest, it is also crucial to note their duties toward their clients.
Effective rules of professional conduct should reflect the special role
of attorneys as well as the society they operate in.
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